docs(roadmap): add #429 — no global --cwd flag; misleading 'Did you mean --acp' hint

Pinpoint: claw --cwd PATH rejected as unknown option globally. --cwd
exists ONLY for system-prompt subcommand. Every other major CLI
(cargo -C, git -C, npm --prefix) has global cwd override. Sibling:
'Did you mean --acp?' hint algorithm matches first-character not
semantic category — --acp is ACP/Zed integration, unrelated to cwd.
This commit is contained in:
YeonGyu-Kim 2026-05-11 14:31:31 +09:00
parent ec882f4c88
commit 075c214439

View File

@ -6362,3 +6362,6 @@ Original filing (2026-04-18): the session emitted `SessionStart hook (completed)
428. **Default `permission_mode` is `danger-full-access` — claw runs with FULL filesystem + network + tool access out of the box, with no opt-in flag and no warning from `doctor`** — dogfooded 2026-05-11 by Jobdori on `72048449` in response to Clawhip pinpoint nudge at `1503260393622212628`. Reproduction (no env vars, isolated `CLAW_CONFIG_HOME`, no config files, no CLI flags): `claw status --output-format json` returns `permission_mode:"danger-full-access"` as the default. The three supported modes per the validator error message are `read-only`, `workspace-write`, `danger-full-access` — and `danger-full-access` is chosen with zero user opt-in. `claw doctor --output-format json` produces a `sandbox` check with `status:"warn", summary:"sandbox was requested but is not currently active"` (because macOS lacks Linux `unshare`), but **emits no warning, info, or summary about the permission_mode itself being danger-full-access**. There is no `permissions` check in `doctor` output at all. **Required fix shape:** (a) change default `permission_mode` to `workspace-write` (safe-by-default: filesystem write limited to cwd, network limited to LLM endpoints, no arbitrary command exec); (b) require explicit `--permission-mode danger-full-access` or `--dangerously-skip-permissions` to opt into full access; (c) add a `permissions` check to `doctor --output-format json` that emits `status:"warn"` when `permission_mode == "danger-full-access"` without explicit source (flag/env/config), with details like `mode:"danger-full-access", source:"default", message:"running with full access without explicit opt-in"`; (d) document the three modes and the default in USAGE.md with one-paragraph descriptions of what each mode allows. **Sibling typed-error bug:** `claw --permission-mode bogus-mode status --output-format json` returns `kind:"unknown"` instead of `kind:"invalid_permission_mode"` — same catch-all problem as #424, #426. **Sibling flag-name asymmetry:** `--dangerously-skip-permissions` works but `--skip-permissions` (Claude Code's flag) returns `kind:"cli_parse"` `unknown option`. Users migrating from Claude Code lose the short flag name. **Why this matters:** every other security-conscious CLI (Docker, kubectl, terraform) requires explicit opt-in for dangerous modes. Defaulting to `danger-full-access` is a footgun for first-time users who pipe `curl install.sh | sh` and immediately get a tool with full filesystem write and arbitrary command exec. The doctor surface is the only diagnostic users consult before trusting the tool, and it stays silent about the most permissive setting. Cross-references #50, #87, #91, #94, #97, #101, #106, #115, #123 (permission-audit sweep) — those all cover permission *rule* and *list* surfaces; #428 covers the *mode default* itself. Source: Jobdori live dogfood, `72048449`, 2026-05-11. 428. **Default `permission_mode` is `danger-full-access` — claw runs with FULL filesystem + network + tool access out of the box, with no opt-in flag and no warning from `doctor`** — dogfooded 2026-05-11 by Jobdori on `72048449` in response to Clawhip pinpoint nudge at `1503260393622212628`. Reproduction (no env vars, isolated `CLAW_CONFIG_HOME`, no config files, no CLI flags): `claw status --output-format json` returns `permission_mode:"danger-full-access"` as the default. The three supported modes per the validator error message are `read-only`, `workspace-write`, `danger-full-access` — and `danger-full-access` is chosen with zero user opt-in. `claw doctor --output-format json` produces a `sandbox` check with `status:"warn", summary:"sandbox was requested but is not currently active"` (because macOS lacks Linux `unshare`), but **emits no warning, info, or summary about the permission_mode itself being danger-full-access**. There is no `permissions` check in `doctor` output at all. **Required fix shape:** (a) change default `permission_mode` to `workspace-write` (safe-by-default: filesystem write limited to cwd, network limited to LLM endpoints, no arbitrary command exec); (b) require explicit `--permission-mode danger-full-access` or `--dangerously-skip-permissions` to opt into full access; (c) add a `permissions` check to `doctor --output-format json` that emits `status:"warn"` when `permission_mode == "danger-full-access"` without explicit source (flag/env/config), with details like `mode:"danger-full-access", source:"default", message:"running with full access without explicit opt-in"`; (d) document the three modes and the default in USAGE.md with one-paragraph descriptions of what each mode allows. **Sibling typed-error bug:** `claw --permission-mode bogus-mode status --output-format json` returns `kind:"unknown"` instead of `kind:"invalid_permission_mode"` — same catch-all problem as #424, #426. **Sibling flag-name asymmetry:** `--dangerously-skip-permissions` works but `--skip-permissions` (Claude Code's flag) returns `kind:"cli_parse"` `unknown option`. Users migrating from Claude Code lose the short flag name. **Why this matters:** every other security-conscious CLI (Docker, kubectl, terraform) requires explicit opt-in for dangerous modes. Defaulting to `danger-full-access` is a footgun for first-time users who pipe `curl install.sh | sh` and immediately get a tool with full filesystem write and arbitrary command exec. The doctor surface is the only diagnostic users consult before trusting the tool, and it stays silent about the most permissive setting. Cross-references #50, #87, #91, #94, #97, #101, #106, #115, #123 (permission-audit sweep) — those all cover permission *rule* and *list* surfaces; #428 covers the *mode default* itself. Source: Jobdori live dogfood, `72048449`, 2026-05-11.
429. **No global `--cwd`/`-C`/`--directory` flag — `claw` cannot be invoked against an arbitrary working directory without first `cd`-ing into it; `--cwd` only exists as a subcommand option for `system-prompt`, and the `cli_parse` "Did you mean --acp?" suggestion is misleading (the `--acp` flag is unrelated to directory selection)** — dogfooded 2026-05-11 by Jobdori on `ec882f4c` in response to Clawhip pinpoint nudge at `1503267943285264394`. Reproduction: `claw --cwd /tmp/claw-dog-cwd status --output-format json``{"error":"unknown option: --cwd","hint":"Did you mean --acp?\nRun `claw --help` for usage.","kind":"cli_parse"}`. Same error for `--cwd <relative>`, `--cwd <nonexistent>`, `--cwd <file-not-dir>`, `--cwd ""`. Inspecting `claw --help`: `--cwd PATH` appears ONLY in the usage line `claw system-prompt [--cwd PATH] [--date YYYY-MM-DD]` — it is not a global flag and is not accepted by `status`, `doctor`, `mcp list`, `init`, or any other subcommand. Users programmatically running claw against multiple workspaces must `cd` into each one before invoking, breaking the `subprocess.run(['claw', 'status', '--cwd', ws], cwd=other_dir)` pattern that every other major CLI (cargo `-C`, git `-C`, npm `--prefix`, gh `--repo` semantically, kubectl `--kubeconfig`+`--context`) supports. **Sibling misleading-suggestion bug:** the `cli_parse` error's `hint` field suggests `Did you mean --acp?` for `--cwd`. `--acp` is the alias for ACP/Zed editor integration (entirely unrelated to working directory). The Levenshtein-distance auto-complete is matching on first-character similarity without considering semantic relatedness. Users following the hint get a totally orthogonal feature. **Required fix shape:** (a) add a global `--cwd PATH` / `-C PATH` flag accepted before any subcommand, parsed in the global flag pre-pass; (b) validate the path exists and is a directory; emit `kind:"invalid_cwd"` with `path:` and `reason:` (`"not_found"`/`"not_a_directory"`/`"empty"`) when validation fails; (c) document the precedence: `--cwd` flag > `$PWD` > `env::current_dir()`; (d) fix the "Did you mean" hint algorithm to filter suggestions by semantic category (don't suggest `--acp` for `--cwd`; suggest `claw system-prompt --cwd PATH` if the user clearly wants `cwd` override but used the wrong scope); (e) regression test: `claw --cwd /tmp status --output-format json` from any `$PWD` returns `workspace.cwd:"/private/tmp"` (or `cwd:"/tmp"` after #421 fix). **Why this matters:** every claw automation orchestrator runs claw against multiple workspaces from a single parent process. Forcing `cd` before each invocation breaks parallelism (can't use shared cwd across concurrent invocations), breaks subprocess wrappers that want to pass cwd explicitly, and breaks `xargs`/`parallel`-style pipelines. Cross-references #421 (cwd canonicalization leak — fix should canonicalize but report user-input via `--cwd`). Source: Jobdori live dogfood, `ec882f4c`, 2026-05-11.