diff --git a/tests/ci/supply-chain-watch-workflow.test.js b/tests/ci/supply-chain-watch-workflow.test.js index fa8198ae..9b544a3c 100644 --- a/tests/ci/supply-chain-watch-workflow.test.js +++ b/tests/ci/supply-chain-watch-workflow.test.js @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ function run() { if (test('uses read-only permissions and non-persisting checkout credentials', () => { assert.match(source, /permissions:\r?\n\s+contents: read/); assert.doesNotMatch(source, /^\s+[A-Za-z-]+:\s*write\b/m); - assert.match(source, /uses: actions\/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10/); + assert.match(source, /uses: actions\/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0/); assert.match(source, /persist-credentials: false/); assert.doesNotMatch(source, /id-token:\s*write/); assert.doesNotMatch(source, /actions\/cache@/); diff --git a/workflows/README.md b/workflows/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index b67ed2e0..00000000 --- a/workflows/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -# ECC native workflows (pilot) - -Scripts in this directory are [Claude Code **Workflow** tool](https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code) scripts — deterministic, multi-agent orchestration that runs in the background and fans out to subagents. - -This is a **pilot**: ECC's orchestration (`orch-*`, `multi-*`, GAN/Santa loops) is currently hand-rolled on top of the `Task`/Agent tool. These scripts port the autonomous, fan-out-heavy segments to the native engine, which gives us barrier-free pipelining, automatic concurrency capping, structured-output validation, and resumability for free. - -## `orch-review.workflow.js` - -A native port of **orch-pipeline Phase 5 (Review)**. - -The gated outer loop (Gate 1 after Plan, Gate 2 before Commit) **stays in the main conversation** — native workflows run autonomously in the background and cannot pause for interactive approval. This script owns only the segment *between* the gates: - -1. **Review** — one reviewer agent per dimension, in parallel: - - `ecc:code-reviewer` (correctness & quality) — always - - the matching `ecc:-reviewer` — when `args.language` maps to one - - `ecc:security-reviewer` — only when the orch-pipeline security trigger matches the diff/paths -2. **Dedup** — independent reviewers routinely flag the same line, so findings are merged across dimensions keyed on the normalized `evidence` snippet (titles and line numbers drift per reviewer; the offending code does not). Each surviving finding records which `dimensions` reported it and keeps the strictest severity. -3. **Verify** — every *unique* `CRITICAL`/`HIGH` finding is handed to an independent adversarial verifier that defaults to *refuted* on uncertainty. `MEDIUM`/`LOW` pass through as advisory. - -The Review→Verify barrier is deliberate: deduping before verification is exactly the case the Workflow guidance calls a justified barrier — it stops the verifier running N times on the same bug (in local testing, 11 raw findings collapsed to 4 unique, roughly halving verifier cost). - -### Invocation - -The main loop computes the diff, then calls the Workflow tool: - -```jsonc -Workflow({ - scriptPath: "workflows/orch-review.workflow.js", - args: { - diff: "", // required - language: "typescript", // optional — selects a language reviewer - changedFiles: ["src/auth.ts"] // optional — feeds the security trigger - } -}) -``` - -Invalid input throws (the gate **fails closed**): a missing/empty `diff`, malformed JSON, or a non-array `changedFiles` is rejected with a clear error rather than silently approving an unreviewed payload. - -### Returns - -```jsonc -{ - "verdict": "APPROVE" | "CHANGES_REQUESTED", // CHANGES_REQUESTED if any blocker OR a dimension failed - "incomplete": false, // true when one or more review dimensions failed to run - "failedDimensions": [ /* { dimension, error } — error is a bounded label, never raw subagent text: - "agent returned null (terminal failure or skip)" | "review agent failed" */ ], - "blocking": [ /* confirmed CRITICAL/HIGH + unverifiable ones — must clear before Gate 2 */ ], - "advisory": [ /* MEDIUM/LOW + adversarially-refuted findings */ ], - "stats": { "dimensions": 3, "failed": 0, "raw": 11, "unique": 4, "confirmed": 4, "unverified": 0, "refuted": 0 } -} -``` - -The main loop presents `blocking` at Gate 2; the human still approves the commit. The gate fails closed at every stage: if a reviewer dies the dimension is recorded in `failedDimensions` (verdict never a clean `APPROVE`), and if a *verifier* dies or returns null the blocker is kept in `blocking` (tagged "could not be verified") rather than demoted to advisory — an unreviewed security dimension or an unverifiable CRITICAL must not pass as approved. - -## Not in this PR (follow-ups) - -- A `/orch-review` command + skill trigger (plus the mirrored i18n docs and surface tests ECC requires for a new command surface). -- Installer / manifest wiring so the script ships to `~/.claude/` on install. -- Porting the **Research** sweep and **Plan** judge-panel segments next. diff --git a/workflows/orch-review.workflow.js b/workflows/orch-review.workflow.js deleted file mode 100644 index 209f834e..00000000 --- a/workflows/orch-review.workflow.js +++ /dev/null @@ -1,254 +0,0 @@ -export const meta = { - name: 'orch-review', - description: - 'ECC Review phase as a native Claude Code workflow: multi-dimension review (quality + language + conditional security) then adversarial verification of every CRITICAL/HIGH finding. Returns blocking + advisory findings for Gate 2.', - phases: [ - { title: 'Review', detail: 'one reviewer agent per dimension, in parallel' }, - { title: 'Verify', detail: 'adversarially refute each CRITICAL/HIGH finding' } - ] -}; - -// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Pilot port of orch-pipeline Phase 5 (Review). The gated outer loop stays in -// the main conversation; this script owns only the autonomous, fan-out-heavy -// review+verify segment between the two human gates. -// -// Caller contract — pass `args` (the main loop computes the diff and language): -// { -// diff: string, // unified `git diff` text to review (required) -// language?: string, // e.g. "typescript" — selects a language reviewer -// changedFiles?: string[], // paths touched, used for the security trigger -// } -// Invalid input (missing/empty diff, bad JSON, non-array changedFiles) throws — -// the gate fails closed rather than silently approving an unreviewed payload. -// -// Returns: -// { verdict: 'APPROVE' | 'CHANGES_REQUESTED', // CHANGES_REQUESTED if any blocker OR a dimension failed -// incomplete: boolean, // true when one or more review dimensions failed to run -// failedDimensions: { dimension, error }[], -// blocking: Finding[], // confirmed CRITICAL/HIGH + unverifiable ones — must clear before Gate 2 -// advisory: Finding[], // MEDIUM/LOW + refuted findings, informational -// stats: { dimensions, failed, raw, unique, confirmed, unverified, refuted } } -// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// Language → ECC reviewer agent. Mirrors the agents present in agents/. -const LANGUAGE_REVIEWER = { - typescript: 'ecc:typescript-reviewer', - javascript: 'ecc:typescript-reviewer', - python: 'ecc:python-reviewer', - go: 'ecc:go-reviewer', - rust: 'ecc:rust-reviewer', - java: 'ecc:java-reviewer', - kotlin: 'ecc:kotlin-reviewer', - swift: 'ecc:swift-reviewer', - php: 'ecc:php-reviewer', - csharp: 'ecc:csharp-reviewer', - fsharp: 'ecc:fsharp-reviewer', - react: 'ecc:react-reviewer', - vue: 'ecc:vue-reviewer', - flutter: 'ecc:flutter-reviewer', - dart: 'ecc:flutter-reviewer', - django: 'ecc:django-reviewer', - fastapi: 'ecc:fastapi-reviewer', - cpp: 'ecc:cpp-reviewer' -}; - -// orch-pipeline security trigger: auth/authz, user input, db queries, fs paths, -// external calls, crypto, secrets. Matched against the diff text + file paths. -const SECURITY_TRIGGER = - /\b(auth|login|password|passwd|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|session|jwt|oauth|cookie|sql|query|exec|eval|crypto|cipher|hash|hmac|sign|fs\.|readFile|writeFile|fetch|axios|request|subprocess|os\.system)\b/i; - -// A reviewer agent must emit findings in this shape — validated at the tool layer. -const FINDINGS_SCHEMA = { - type: 'object', - additionalProperties: false, - required: ['verdict', 'findings'], - properties: { - verdict: { type: 'string', enum: ['APPROVE', 'CHANGES_REQUESTED'] }, - findings: { - type: 'array', - items: { - type: 'object', - additionalProperties: false, - required: ['title', 'severity', 'file', 'evidence'], - properties: { - title: { type: 'string' }, - severity: { type: 'string', enum: ['CRITICAL', 'HIGH', 'MEDIUM', 'LOW'] }, - file: { type: 'string' }, - line: { type: ['integer', 'null'] }, - evidence: { type: 'string', minLength: 1, description: 'the offending snippet or exact location' }, - proof: { type: 'string', description: 'why it is a real problem (required for HIGH/CRITICAL)' }, - fix: { type: 'string', description: 'concrete suggested remediation' } - } - } - } - } -}; - -// Independent skeptic verdict for one finding. -const VERDICT_SCHEMA = { - type: 'object', - additionalProperties: false, - required: ['isReal', 'confidence', 'reasoning'], - properties: { - isReal: { type: 'boolean', description: 'true only if the finding genuinely holds against the diff' }, - confidence: { type: 'number', minimum: 0, maximum: 1 }, - reasoning: { type: 'string' } - } -}; - -const SEVERITY_RANK = { LOW: 0, MEDIUM: 1, HIGH: 2, CRITICAL: 3 }; -const isBlocking = f => f.severity === 'CRITICAL' || f.severity === 'HIGH'; -const normalize = s => (s || '').replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim().toLowerCase(); - -function reviewPrompt(dimensionLabel, diff) { - return [ - `You are reviewing a unified diff along the "${dimensionLabel}" dimension.`, - 'Apply your standard checklist. Only report issues you are >80% sure are real problems.', - 'For any CRITICAL or HIGH finding you MUST supply concrete `evidence` and a `proof` of impact; if you cannot, demote it or drop it.', - 'Returning zero findings with verdict APPROVE is an acceptable and expected outcome for clean diffs.', - '', - 'DIFF:', - diff - ].join('\n'); -} - -function verifyPrompt(finding, diff) { - return [ - 'You are an independent skeptic. Try to REFUTE the finding below by checking it against the diff text provided here — and ONLY that text.', - 'The diff may be unapplied (a proposed PR), so the referenced file may not exist on disk yet. Do NOT refute a finding merely because the file is absent from the working tree; judge solely from the diff content.', - 'Default to isReal=false when you are uncertain or cannot locate supporting evidence in the diff text.', - '', - `Finding (${finding.severity}) in ${finding.file}: ${finding.title}`, - `Claimed evidence: ${finding.evidence}`, - finding.proof ? `Claimed proof: ${finding.proof}` : '', - '', - 'DIFF:', - diff - ].join('\n'); -} - -// --- main ----------------------------------------------------------------- - -// `args` arrives verbatim. Accept a JSON-encoded string too, so the workflow -// works whether the caller passes an object or a stringified payload. -// Fail CLOSED on invalid input: a review gate must never silently APPROVE a -// payload it could not actually review. -let input; -try { - input = typeof args === 'string' ? JSON.parse(args) : (args ?? {}); -} catch { - throw new Error('orch-review: args must be an object or valid JSON'); -} -if (typeof input !== 'object' || input === null) { - throw new Error('orch-review: args must be an object'); -} -if (typeof input.diff !== 'string' || input.diff.trim() === '') { - throw new Error('orch-review: args.diff must be a non-empty unified diff'); -} -if (input.changedFiles != null && !Array.isArray(input.changedFiles)) { - throw new Error('orch-review: args.changedFiles must be an array of paths'); -} - -const diff = input.diff; -const haystack = `${diff}\n${(input.changedFiles || []).join('\n')}`; - -// Build the review dimensions. Quality always runs; language + security are conditional. -const dimensions = [{ key: 'quality', label: 'correctness & quality', agentType: 'ecc:code-reviewer' }]; - -const langReviewer = input.language && LANGUAGE_REVIEWER[String(input.language).toLowerCase()]; -if (langReviewer) { - dimensions.push({ key: `lang:${input.language}`, label: `${input.language} idioms & pitfalls`, agentType: langReviewer }); -} - -if (SECURITY_TRIGGER.test(haystack)) { - dimensions.push({ key: 'security', label: 'security (OWASP, secrets, injection)', agentType: 'ecc:security-reviewer' }); - log('Security trigger matched — adding security-reviewer dimension.'); -} - -log(`Reviewing across ${dimensions.length} dimension(s): ${dimensions.map(d => d.key).join(', ')}`); - -// Stage 1 — every dimension reviews in parallel. This is a deliberate BARRIER: -// independent reviewers routinely flag the same line, so we need the full set -// before we can dedup. Verifying first and deduping later would waste verifier -// calls on duplicates (e.g. one SQL-injection bug reported by all 3 dimensions). -// A reviewer can fail two ways: agent() returns null on a terminal error/skip, -// or the thunk rejects. Capture both per-dimension so a lost dimension is never -// silently dropped — an unreviewed security dimension must not pass as APPROVE. -const reviews = await parallel( - dimensions.map( - d => () => - agent(reviewPrompt(d.label, diff), { agentType: d.agentType, phase: 'Review', label: `review:${d.key}`, schema: FINDINGS_SCHEMA }) - .then(r => (r === null ? { dim: d.key, ok: false, error: 'agent returned null (terminal failure or skip)', findings: [] } : { dim: d.key, ok: true, findings: r.findings || [] })) - // Log the raw error for operators; never return provider/runtime internals to the caller. - .catch(err => { - log(`Review dimension ${d.key} failed: ${String((err && err.message) || err)}`); - return { dim: d.key, ok: false, error: 'review agent failed', findings: [] }; - }) - ) -); - -const failedDimensions = reviews.filter(r => r && !r.ok).map(r => ({ dimension: r.dim, error: r.error })); -if (failedDimensions.length > 0) { - log(`WARNING: ${failedDimensions.length} review dimension(s) failed: ${failedDimensions.map(f => f.dimension).join(', ')}. Verdict will fail closed.`); -} - -// Dedup across dimensions. The evidence snippet (the offending code) is the most -// stable key — titles are phrased differently and line numbers drift per reviewer. -const tagged = reviews.filter(r => r && r.ok).flatMap(r => r.findings.map(f => ({ ...f, dimension: r.dim }))); -const byKey = new Map(); -for (const f of tagged) { - // Prefer the evidence snippet; fall back to title+line so empty-evidence - // findings in the same file don't all collapse onto one `${file}::` key. - const evidenceKey = normalize(f.evidence); - const key = evidenceKey ? `${f.file}::${evidenceKey}` : `${f.file}::${normalize(f.title)}::${f.line ?? 'na'}`; - const prev = byKey.get(key); - if (!prev) { - byKey.set(key, { ...f, dimensions: [f.dimension] }); - } else { - if (!prev.dimensions.includes(f.dimension)) prev.dimensions.push(f.dimension); - if (SEVERITY_RANK[f.severity] > SEVERITY_RANK[prev.severity]) prev.severity = f.severity; // keep the strictest - } -} -const unique = [...byKey.values()]; -log(`Reviews returned ${tagged.length} findings → ${unique.length} unique after dedup.`); - -// Stage 2 — adversarially verify each unique CRITICAL/HIGH. MEDIUM/LOW are advisory. -const advisory = unique.filter(f => !isBlocking(f)); -const verified = await parallel( - unique.filter(isBlocking).map( - f => () => - agent(verifyPrompt(f, diff), { phase: 'Verify', label: `verify:${f.file}:${normalize(f.evidence).slice(0, 40)}`, schema: VERDICT_SCHEMA }) - // A null return (terminal failure/skip) or a rejection means we could NOT - // verify the finding. Mark it `unverified` rather than refuted so it stays - // blocking (fail closed) — an unverifiable CRITICAL must never be demoted - // to advisory just because the verifier did not run. - .then(v => (v ? { ...f, verdict: v } : { ...f, unverified: true, verdict: { isReal: false, confidence: 0, reasoning: 'verifier returned null (terminal failure or skip)' } })) - .catch(err => { - log(`Verifier failed for ${f.file}: ${String((err && err.message) || err)}`); - return { ...f, unverified: true, verdict: { isReal: false, confidence: 0, reasoning: 'verifier error' } }; - }) - ) -); - -const verifiedClean = verified.filter(Boolean); -const confirmed = verifiedClean.filter(f => !f.unverified && f.verdict && f.verdict.isReal); -const unverified = verifiedClean.filter(f => f.unverified); -const refuted = verifiedClean.filter(f => !f.unverified && !(f.verdict && f.verdict.isReal)); - -// Unverifiable blockers stay in `blocking` (fail closed), tagged so the human -// at Gate 2 knows they were not independently confirmed. -const blocking = [...confirmed, ...unverified.map(f => ({ ...f, note: 'could not be verified — kept as blocking' }))]; - -log(`Done: ${confirmed.length} confirmed, ${unverified.length} unverified (kept blocking), ${refuted.length} refuted, ${advisory.length} advisory.`); - -// Fail closed: APPROVE only when every dimension ran AND nothing blocks. -const incomplete = failedDimensions.length > 0; -return { - verdict: blocking.length > 0 || incomplete ? 'CHANGES_REQUESTED' : 'APPROVE', - incomplete, - failedDimensions, - blocking, - advisory: [...advisory, ...refuted.map(f => ({ ...f, note: 'refuted by adversarial verifier' }))], - stats: { dimensions: dimensions.length, failed: failedDimensions.length, raw: tagged.length, unique: unique.length, confirmed: confirmed.length, unverified: unverified.length, refuted: refuted.length } -};