fix(security): add host/origin allowlist + validate git refs + quote workflow input (#2185)

Three defense-in-depth fixes around untrusted input flowing to subprocess execution:

1. **Control-pane HTTP server (scripts/lib/control-pane/server.js)**
   The local control-pane API binds to 127.0.0.1 but had no Host or Origin
   validation, so a DNS-rebinding attack from a malicious website could pivot
   into the loopback endpoints — including POST /api/actions/:id, which spawns
   'cargo run -- graph ...' with caller-supplied query strings. Add a hostname
   allowlist (loopback variants plus the explicitly configured --host) and
   reject mismatched Host (421) or non-loopback Origin (403) before any route
   handler runs.

2. **OpenCode git-summary tool (.opencode/tools/git-summary.ts)**
   The tool was building 'git diff ${baseBranch}...HEAD --stat' with execSync
   and a raw model-supplied baseBranch string. Switch run() to execFileSync
   with an args array (no shell), validate baseBranch against a conservative
   git-ref allowlist (rejects shell metacharacters, leading -, embedded ..),
   and clamp the depth arg to a small positive integer before interpolating
   into 'git log --oneline -<N>'.

3. **Reusable test workflow (.github/workflows/reusable-test.yml)**
   The 'Install dependencies' step interpolated ${{ inputs.package-manager }}
   directly into a bash 'case' and into an echo, so a downstream caller that
   forwarded attacker-controllable input could inject into the runner. Move
   the input into a PACKAGE_MANAGER env var and reference $PACKAGE_MANAGER
   inside the script per the GitHub script-injection guidance.

Detected by Aeon + semgrep p/security-audit (host check via threat-model
manual-review axis; git-summary via detect-child-process; workflow via
run-shell-injection).

Verification: node tests/run-all.js — 2686/2687 pre-existing tests pass; the
one failure (observe.sh legacy output fallback) reproduces on main without
this branch applied. Added 2 new control-pane tests covering the allowlist
classifier and the DNS-rebinding-gate behavior end-to-end.

---
Filed by [Aeon](https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon-aaron).

Co-authored-by: aeonframework <aeon@aaronjmars.com>

.github/workflows/reusable-test.yml

@@ -69,8 +69,9 @@ jobs:
           COREPACK_ENABLE_STRICT: '0'
           npm_config_ignore_scripts: 'true'
           YARN_ENABLE_SCRIPTS: 'false'
+          PACKAGE_MANAGER: ${{ inputs.package-manager }}
         run: |
-          case "${{ inputs.package-manager }}" in
+          case "$PACKAGE_MANAGER" in
             npm) npm ci --ignore-scripts ;;
             # pnpm v10 can fail CI on ignored native build scripts
             # (for example msgpackr-extract) even though this repo is Yarn-native
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ jobs:
             # Yarn Berry (v4+) removed --ignore-engines; engine checking is no longer a core feature
             yarn) yarn install --mode=skip-build ;;
             bun) bun install --ignore-scripts ;;
-            *) echo "Unsupported package manager: ${{ inputs.package-manager }}" && exit 1 ;;
+            *) echo "Unsupported package manager: $PACKAGE_MANAGER" && exit 1 ;;
           esac
 
       - name: Run tests

.opencode/tools/git-summary.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,24 @@
  */
 
 import { tool, type ToolDefinition } from "@opencode-ai/plugin/tool"
-import { execSync } from "child_process"
+import { execFileSync } from "child_process"
+
+// Conservative subset of git's allowed ref-name characters. Rejects shell
+// metacharacters and option-like leading `-` so a model-supplied baseBranch
+// cannot inject into the shell command line built below.
+const SAFE_GIT_REF = /^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$/
+
+function isSafeRef(ref: string): boolean {
+  if (typeof ref !== "string" || ref.length === 0 || ref.length > 200) return false
+  if (!SAFE_GIT_REF.test(ref)) return false
+  if (ref.startsWith("-") || ref.startsWith(".") || ref.startsWith("/")) return false
+  if (ref.includes("..") || ref.includes("//")) return false
+  return true
+}
+
+function isSafeDepth(value: unknown): value is number {
+  return typeof value === "number" && Number.isInteger(value) && value > 0 && value <= 1000
+}
 
 const gitSummaryTool: ToolDefinition = tool({
   description:
@@ -26,19 +43,22 @@ const gitSummaryTool: ToolDefinition = tool({
   },
   async execute(args, context) {
     const cwd = context.worktree || context.directory
-    const depth = args.depth ?? 5
+    const depth = isSafeDepth(args.depth) ? args.depth : 5
     const includeDiff = args.includeDiff ?? true
     const baseBranch = args.baseBranch ?? "main"
 
     const result: Record<string, string> = {
-      branch: run("git branch --show-current", cwd) || "unknown",
-      status: run("git status --short", cwd) || "clean",
-      log: run(`git log --oneline -${depth}`, cwd) || "no commits found",
+      branch: runArgs(["branch", "--show-current"], cwd) || "unknown",
+      status: runArgs(["status", "--short"], cwd) || "clean",
+      log: runArgs(["log", "--oneline", `-${depth}`], cwd) || "no commits found",
     }
 
     if (includeDiff) {
-      result.stagedDiff = run("git diff --cached --stat", cwd) || ""
-      result.branchDiff = run(`git diff ${baseBranch}...HEAD --stat`, cwd) || `unable to diff against ${baseBranch}`
+      result.stagedDiff = runArgs(["diff", "--cached", "--stat"], cwd) || ""
+      result.branchDiff = isSafeRef(baseBranch)
+        ? runArgs(["diff", `${baseBranch}...HEAD`, "--stat"], cwd) ||
+          `unable to diff against ${baseBranch}`
+        : `unable to diff against ${baseBranch} (invalid ref)`
     }
 
     return JSON.stringify(result)
@@ -47,9 +67,9 @@ const gitSummaryTool: ToolDefinition = tool({
 
 export default gitSummaryTool
 
-function run(command: string, cwd: string): string {
+function runArgs(args: string[], cwd: string): string {
   try {
-    return execSync(command, { cwd, encoding: "utf-8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }).trim()
+    return execFileSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf-8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }).trim()
   } catch {
     return ""
   }

scripts/lib/control-pane/server.js

@@ -9,6 +9,43 @@ const { buildControlPaneAction } = require('./actions');
 const { buildControlPaneSnapshot, resolveControlPaneConfig } = require('./state');
 const { renderControlPaneHtml } = require('./ui');
 
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '[::1]', '::1']);
+
+// Extract the hostname portion of an HTTP Host header value, stripping any
+// port. Returns null when the header is missing or malformed. Used to gate
+// requests against a local-only allowlist so DNS-rebinding cannot pivot a
+// browser tab into the loopback control-pane API.
+function parseHostHeader(value) {
+  if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') return null;
+  const trimmed = value.trim();
+  if (!trimmed) return null;
+  const match = trimmed.match(/^(\[[^\]]+\]|[^:]+)(?::\d+)?$/);
+  if (!match) return null;
+  return match[1].toLowerCase();
+}
+
+function buildAllowedHostnames(configuredHost) {
+  const set = new Set(LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES);
+  if (configuredHost) set.add(String(configuredHost).toLowerCase());
+  return set;
+}
+
+function isAllowedHostHeader(hostHeader, allowedHostnames) {
+  const hostname = parseHostHeader(hostHeader);
+  if (!hostname) return false;
+  return allowedHostnames.has(hostname);
+}
+
+function isAllowedOrigin(originHeader, allowedHostnames) {
+  if (!originHeader || typeof originHeader !== 'string') return true;
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(originHeader);
+    return allowedHostnames.has(url.hostname.toLowerCase());
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
 function usage() {
   return [
     'Usage:',
@@ -159,9 +196,19 @@ function createControlPaneServer(options = {}) {
     env: options.env || process.env,
   });
   const baseQuery = options.query || '';
+  const allowedHostnames = buildAllowedHostnames(host);
 
   const server = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
     try {
+      if (!isAllowedHostHeader(req.headers.host, allowedHostnames)) {
+        sendJson(res, 421, { ok: false, error: 'Misdirected request' });
+        return;
+      }
+      if (!isAllowedOrigin(req.headers.origin, allowedHostnames)) {
+        sendJson(res, 403, { ok: false, error: 'Forbidden origin' });
+        return;
+      }
+
       const requestUrl = new URL(req.url, `http://${host}:${port || 0}`);
 
       if (req.method === 'GET' && requestUrl.pathname === '/') {
@@ -280,5 +327,8 @@ module.exports = {
   createControlPaneServer,
   parseArgs,
   runAction,
+  isAllowedHostHeader,
+  isAllowedOrigin,
+  buildAllowedHostnames,
   usage,
 };

tests/scripts/control-pane.test.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 const assert = require('assert');
 const fs = require('fs');
+const http = require('http');
 const os = require('os');
 const path = require('path');
 const { spawn, spawnSync } = require('child_process');
@@ -14,6 +15,9 @@ const {
   createControlPaneServer,
   parseArgs,
   runAction,
+  isAllowedHostHeader,
+  isAllowedOrigin,
+  buildAllowedHostnames,
 } = require('../../scripts/lib/control-pane/server');
 const {
   main: runControlPaneCli,
@@ -326,6 +330,92 @@ async function runTests() {
     }
   })) passed++; else failed++;
 
+  if (await test('classifies Host and Origin headers against the loopback allowlist', async () => {
+    const allowed = buildAllowedHostnames('127.0.0.1');
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('127.0.0.1:8765', allowed), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('localhost:8765', allowed), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('LOCALHOST:8765', allowed), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('[::1]:8765', allowed), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('attacker.example.com:8765', allowed), false);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('rebind.dnsbin.io', allowed), false);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('', allowed), false);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader(undefined, allowed), false);
+
+    // Origin is optional; absence is allowed for non-browser clients.
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedOrigin(undefined, allowed), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedOrigin('', allowed), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedOrigin('http://127.0.0.1:8765', allowed), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedOrigin('http://localhost', allowed), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedOrigin('http://attacker.example.com', allowed), false);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedOrigin('not-a-url', allowed), false);
+
+    // A non-default configured host should still admit loopback variants.
+    const lan = buildAllowedHostnames('192.168.1.10');
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('192.168.1.10:8765', lan), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('127.0.0.1:8765', lan), true);
+    assert.strictEqual(isAllowedHostHeader('attacker.example.com:8765', lan), false);
+  })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+  if (await test('rejects requests forged with a non-loopback Host header (DNS rebinding gate)', async () => {
+    const app = await createControlPaneServer({
+      host: '127.0.0.1',
+      port: 0,
+      repoRoot: REPO_ROOT,
+      allowActions: true,
+    });
+
+    await app.listen();
+    try {
+      const address = app.server.address();
+      const actualPort = address && typeof address === 'object' ? address.port : 0;
+
+      const sendWithHeaders = (method, pathname, headers, body) =>
+        new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+          const req = http.request(
+            { host: '127.0.0.1', port: actualPort, method, path: pathname, headers },
+            response => {
+              let chunks = '';
+              response.on('data', chunk => {
+                chunks += chunk.toString('utf8');
+              });
+              response.on('end', () => {
+                resolve({ status: response.statusCode, body: chunks });
+              });
+            }
+          );
+          req.on('error', reject);
+          if (body) req.write(body);
+          req.end();
+        });
+
+      const forgedHost = await sendWithHeaders('GET', '/api/health', { Host: 'attacker.example.com:1234' });
+      assert.strictEqual(forgedHost.status, 421);
+      assert.match(forgedHost.body, /Misdirected request/);
+
+      const forgedActionHost = await sendWithHeaders(
+        'POST',
+        '/api/actions/sync-knowledge',
+        { Host: 'attacker.example.com:1234', 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+        JSON.stringify({ query: 'rebound' })
+      );
+      assert.strictEqual(forgedActionHost.status, 421);
+
+      const forgedOrigin = await sendWithHeaders('GET', '/api/health', {
+        Host: '127.0.0.1:' + actualPort,
+        Origin: 'http://attacker.example.com',
+      });
+      assert.strictEqual(forgedOrigin.status, 403);
+      assert.match(forgedOrigin.body, /Forbidden origin/);
+
+      const okHost = await sendWithHeaders('GET', '/api/health', { Host: '127.0.0.1:' + actualPort });
+      assert.strictEqual(okHost.status, 200);
+      const okBody = JSON.parse(okHost.body);
+      assert.strictEqual(okBody.ok, true);
+    } finally {
+      await app.close();
+    }
+  })) passed++; else failed++;
+
   if (await test('runAction captures success, failure, and bounded output', async () => {
     const repoRoot = REPO_ROOT;
     const success = await runAction({