fix(security): gateguard classifier bypasses (GHSA-4v57) + Windows CI + claw ReDoS

- gateguard (GHSA-4v57-ph3x-gf55): add a quote-aware detection pass that
  dequotes command words and splits on UNQUOTED separators incl. newlines, so
  newline-separated commands, quoted command words ('rm'/"rm"), quoted
  find -exec, and sh/bash -c wrappers are all classified destructive. Additive —
  existing 133 cases still pass; +7 bypass regressions + a false-positive guard
  (rm inside a quoted echo arg stays allowed). 140/140.
- Windows CI: format-code.ts emitted backslash paths via path.normalize, breaking
  forward-slash assertions on all Windows matrix cells — force forward slashes.
- claw.js (CodeQL #1 js/polynomial-redos): bound parseTurns input so the lazy
  [\s\S]*? body can't drive O(n^2) scanning on adversarial history files.

Full suite 2852/2852; lint green.

.opencode/tools/format-code.ts

@@ -104,9 +104,11 @@ function detectFormatter(cwd: string, ext: string): Formatter | null {
 }
 
 function buildFormatterCommand(formatter: Formatter, filePath: string, cwd?: string): string {
-  // Normalize path for cross-platform compatibility
-  const normalizedPath = path.normalize(filePath)
-  
+  // Normalize to forward slashes so the emitted command is identical on every
+  // platform. `path.normalize` yields backslashes on Windows, which broke the
+  // command string (and Windows CI); all formatter CLIs accept `/` on Windows.
+  const normalizedPath = path.normalize(filePath).split(path.sep).join("/")
+
   // Build command based on formatter and platform
   const commands: Record<Formatter, string> = {
     biome: `npx @biomejs/biome format --write ${normalizedPath}`,

scripts/claw.js

@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ function getSessionPath(name) {
 function listSessions(dir) {
   const clawDir = dir || getClawDir();
   if (!fs.existsSync(clawDir)) return [];
-  return fs.readdirSync(clawDir)
+  return fs
+    .readdirSync(clawDir)
     .filter(f => f.endsWith('.md'))
     .map(f => f.replace(/\.md$/, ''));
 }
@@ -55,7 +56,10 @@ function appendTurn(filePath, role, content, timestamp) {
 function normalizeSkillList(raw) {
   if (!raw) return [];
   if (Array.isArray(raw)) return raw.map(s => String(s).trim()).filter(Boolean);
-  return String(raw).split(',').map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+  return String(raw)
+    .split(',')
+    .map(s => s.trim())
+    .filter(Boolean);
 }
 
 function loadECCContext(skillList) {
@@ -104,7 +108,7 @@ function askClaude(systemPrompt, history, userMessage, model) {
     stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
     env: { ...process.env, CLAUDECODE: '' },
     timeout: 300000,
-    shell: process.platform === 'win32',
+    shell: process.platform === 'win32'
   });
 
   if (result.error) {
@@ -120,9 +124,14 @@ function askClaude(systemPrompt, history, userMessage, model) {
 
 function parseTurns(history) {
   const turns = [];
+  // Bound the input: the lazy `[\s\S]*?` body re-scans toward EOF from each
+  // `### [` start, so a very large/adversarial history file can drive O(n^2)
+  // scanning (ReDoS). Session histories are far below this cap.
+  const text = String(history || '');
+  const safe = text.length > 5_000_000 ? text.slice(0, 5_000_000) : text;
   const regex = /### \[([^\]]+)\] ([^\n]+)\n([\s\S]*?)\n---\n/g;
   let match;
-  while ((match = regex.exec(history)) !== null) {
+  while ((match = regex.exec(safe)) !== null) {
     turns.push({ timestamp: match[1], role: match[2], content: match[3] });
   }
   return turns;
@@ -145,12 +154,14 @@ function getSessionMetrics(filePath) {
     userTurns,
     assistantTurns,
     charCount,
-    tokenEstimate,
+    tokenEstimate
   };
 }
 
 function searchSessions(query, dir) {
-  const q = String(query || '').toLowerCase().trim();
+  const q = String(query || '')
+    .toLowerCase()
+    .trim();
   if (!q) return [];
 
   const sessionDir = dir || getClawDir();
@@ -297,7 +308,7 @@ function main() {
     sessionName: initialSessionName,
     sessionPath: getSessionPath(initialSessionName),
     model: DEFAULT_MODEL,
-    skills: normalizeSkillList(process.env.CLAW_SKILLS || ''),
+    skills: normalizeSkillList(process.env.CLAW_SKILLS || '')
   };
 
   let eccContext = loadECCContext(state.skills);
@@ -314,7 +325,7 @@ function main() {
   const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
 
   const prompt = () => {
-    rl.question('claw> ', (input) => {
+    rl.question('claw> ', input => {
       const line = input.trim();
       if (!line) return prompt();
 
@@ -469,7 +480,7 @@ module.exports = {
   compactSession,
   exportSession,
   branchSession,
-  main,
+  main
 };
 
 if (require.main === module) {

scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js

@@ -220,6 +220,106 @@ function tokenizeAllowlistedShellWords(input) {
   return tokens;
 }
 
+const SHELL_SEGMENT_SEPARATORS = new Set([';', '|', '&', '\n', '\r']);
+
+/**
+ * Quote-aware split of a command line into segments, with quotes removed from
+ * the resulting words. Splits only on UNQUOTED `;`, `|`, `&`, and newlines so:
+ *  - a quoted command word (`'rm'`, `"rm"`) normalizes to `rm` (the shell
+ *    treats quotes around a command name as transparent), and
+ *  - a newline behaves as a command separator (the shell runs each line),
+ * neither of which `stripQuotedStrings` + naive splitting handles — both were
+ * destructive-classifier bypasses (GHSA-4v57-ph3x-gf55).
+ *
+ * @param {string} input
+ * @returns {string[][]} array of dequoted token arrays, one per segment
+ */
+function quoteAwareSegments(input) {
+  const segments = [];
+  let words = [];
+  let current = '';
+  let hasWord = false;
+  let quote = null;
+  let escaped = false;
+
+  const flushWord = () => {
+    if (hasWord) words.push(current);
+    current = '';
+    hasWord = false;
+  };
+  const flushSegment = () => {
+    flushWord();
+    if (words.length) segments.push(words);
+    words = [];
+  };
+
+  for (const ch of String(input || '')) {
+    if (escaped) {
+      current += ch;
+      hasWord = true;
+      escaped = false;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === '\\') {
+      escaped = true;
+      hasWord = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (quote) {
+      if (ch === quote) quote = null;
+      else current += ch;
+      hasWord = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
+      quote = ch;
+      hasWord = true; // entering a quote starts a word, even if its content is empty
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (SHELL_SEGMENT_SEPARATORS.has(ch)) {
+      flushSegment();
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (/\s/.test(ch)) {
+      flushWord();
+      continue;
+    }
+    current += ch;
+    hasWord = true;
+  }
+  flushSegment();
+  return segments;
+}
+
+const SHELL_WRAPPERS = new Set(['sh', 'bash', 'zsh', 'dash', 'ksh']);
+
+/**
+ * Quote-aware destructive check: catches quoted command words, newline
+ * separators, quoted `find -exec`, and `sh -c`/`bash -c` wrappers that evade
+ * the quote-stripping path (GHSA-4v57-ph3x-gf55).
+ *
+ * @param {string} raw
+ * @param {number} [depth] recursion guard for shell -c wrappers
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isDestructiveQuoteAware(raw, depth = 0) {
+  if (depth > 4) return false;
+  for (const tokens of quoteAwareSegments(raw)) {
+    if (tokens.length === 0) continue;
+    if (isDestructiveRm(tokens)) return true;
+    if (isDestructiveGit(tokens)) return true;
+    if (isDestructiveFindExec(tokens.join(' '))) return true;
+    const base = commandBasename(tokens[0]);
+    if (SHELL_WRAPPERS.has(base)) {
+      const ci = tokens.indexOf('-c');
+      if (ci !== -1 && tokens[ci + 1] && isDestructiveQuoteAware(tokens[ci + 1], depth + 1)) {
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * Strip a leading path and trailing `.exe` from a command token so
  * `/usr/bin/git`, `git.exe`, and `GIT` all normalize to `git`.
@@ -566,6 +666,11 @@ function isDestructiveBash(command) {
     if (isDestructiveRm(tokens)) return true;
     if (isDestructiveGit(tokens)) return true;
   }
+
+  // Quote-aware pass: closes the quoted-command-word, newline-separator,
+  // quoted-find-exec, and sh/bash -c bypasses (GHSA-4v57-ph3x-gf55).
+  if (isDestructiveQuoteAware(raw)) return true;
+
   return false;
 }