6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Affaan Mustafa
a03d63cba0 fix(security): close XSS in control-pane board controls
The interactive claim/move buttons concatenated work-item ids into inline
onclick JS with only single-quote escaping — a crafted id (ids/titles come from
GitHub sync and manual upserts, not a strict allowlist) could break out and
inject script, even on the localhost-only server.

Fix: emit the id/lane in HTML-escaped data-* attributes (escapeHtml encodes
&<>"'), attach delegated click listeners that read them via getAttribute, and
pass the raw value as a JS string arg — never concatenated into code. Adds a
regression assertion that no inline onclick handlers with interpolated ids
remain. Flagged by automated security review.

Full suite 2845/2845; lint green.
2026-06-18 18:25:28 -04:00
Affaan Mustafa
607ab02b1f feat(control-pane): interactive JIT board — claim/move cards from the webapp
The board was read-only; you can now drive the agent+human JIT workflow from the
local control pane.

- New shared scripts/lib/control-pane/work-item-mutations.js (claimWorkItem,
  moveWorkItem) so the CLI and server never diverge; work-items.js claim now
  delegates to it.
- server.js: gated POST /api/work-items/:id/claim and /:id/move (localhost-only,
  honors --read-only with 403). Claim sets owner + assigneeKind and moves to
  running; move retargets the kanban lane.
- ui.js: per-card Claim (on unassigned cards) + lane buttons that POST and
  refresh; 15s live auto-refresh (paused when the tab is hidden).
- Tests: interactive claim/move endpoints, read-only 403, invalid-lane 400, and
  snapshot reflects mutations.

Full suite 2845/2845; lint green.
2026-06-18 18:16:46 -04:00
Affaan Mustafa
1efc399ab4 feat(control-pane): add agent+human JIT assignment view to the work-items board
The kanban board tracked lanes (ready/running/blocked/done) but not WHO owns
each card, which is the missing piece for agent+human just-in-time team workflows.

- state.js: classifyAssignee() labels each work item agent | human | unassigned
  (session-linked or agent-pattern owners = agent; named owners = human; ownerless
  = unassigned), with an explicit metadata.assigneeKind override.
- summarizeWorkItems(): adds an assignment summary {agent,human,unassigned} over
  OPEN cards plus a priority-sorted needsAssignment queue — the JIT pickup list.
- ui.js: cards show an [agent]/[human]/[unassigned] badge; the board header shows
  agent/human split and 'N need owner'.
- Tests: assignment classification + JIT queue coverage in control-pane-state.

Full suite 2839/2839; lint green.
2026-06-18 16:59:30 -04:00
@aaronjmars
1c3280dc0d
fix(security): add host/origin allowlist + validate git refs + quote workflow input (#2185)
Three defense-in-depth fixes around untrusted input flowing to subprocess execution:

1. **Control-pane HTTP server (scripts/lib/control-pane/server.js)**
   The local control-pane API binds to 127.0.0.1 but had no Host or Origin
   validation, so a DNS-rebinding attack from a malicious website could pivot
   into the loopback endpoints — including POST /api/actions/:id, which spawns
   'cargo run -- graph ...' with caller-supplied query strings. Add a hostname
   allowlist (loopback variants plus the explicitly configured --host) and
   reject mismatched Host (421) or non-loopback Origin (403) before any route
   handler runs.

2. **OpenCode git-summary tool (.opencode/tools/git-summary.ts)**
   The tool was building 'git diff ${baseBranch}...HEAD --stat' with execSync
   and a raw model-supplied baseBranch string. Switch run() to execFileSync
   with an args array (no shell), validate baseBranch against a conservative
   git-ref allowlist (rejects shell metacharacters, leading -, embedded ..),
   and clamp the depth arg to a small positive integer before interpolating
   into 'git log --oneline -<N>'.

3. **Reusable test workflow (.github/workflows/reusable-test.yml)**
   The 'Install dependencies' step interpolated ${{ inputs.package-manager }}
   directly into a bash 'case' and into an echo, so a downstream caller that
   forwarded attacker-controllable input could inject into the runner. Move
   the input into a PACKAGE_MANAGER env var and reference $PACKAGE_MANAGER
   inside the script per the GitHub script-injection guidance.

Detected by Aeon + semgrep p/security-audit (host check via threat-model
manual-review axis; git-summary via detect-child-process; workflow via
run-shell-injection).

Verification: node tests/run-all.js — 2686/2687 pre-existing tests pass; the
one failure (observe.sh legacy output fallback) reproduces on main without
this branch applied. Added 2 new control-pane tests covering the allowlist
classifier and the DNS-rebinding-gate behavior end-to-end.

---
Filed by [Aeon](https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon-aaron).

Co-authored-by: aeonframework <aeon@aaronjmars.com>
2026-06-15 13:49:40 -04:00
Affaan Mustafa
bc8e12bb80
feat: add dynamic workflow team orchestration surface
Adds dynamic workflow/team orchestration skills, the content pack, and control-pane work-item/Kanban state DB support. Includes reviewer hardening for state-db CLI validation, optional state DB failure handling, and mergeStateStatus projection.
2026-06-04 21:45:13 +08:00
Affaan Mustafa
0f84c0e279
feat: add ECC2 local control pane (#2131)
* feat: add ECC2 local control pane

* fix: refresh control pane package locks

* test: harden control pane coverage

* test: allow portable control pane shutdown

* test: retry local control pane fetches

* fix: harden control pane error handling

* fix: wrap control pane metadata
2026-06-03 21:54:30 +08:00