everything-claude-code/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
seto dd2962ee92 fix: 5 bugs + 2 tests from 3-agent deep bughunt
Bugs fixed:
- B1: JS gate messages still said "cat one real record" -> redacted/synthetic
- B2: Destructive bash key used 200-char truncation (collision bypass) -> SHA256 hash
- B3: sanitizePath only stripped \n\r -> now strips null bytes, bidi overrides, all control chars
- B4: Tool name matching was case-sensitive (latent bypass) -> lookup map normalization
- B5: SKILL.md Gate Types missing MultiEdit -> added with explanation

Tests added:
- T1: MultiEdit gate denies first unchecked file (CRITICAL - was untested)
- T2: MultiEdit allows after all files gated

11/11 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-13 16:32:46 +09:00

256 lines
8.3 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* PreToolUse Hook: GateGuard Fact-Forcing Gate
*
* Forces Claude to investigate before editing files or running commands.
* Instead of asking "are you sure?" (which LLMs always answer "yes"),
* this hook demands concrete facts: importers, public API, data schemas.
*
* The act of investigation creates awareness that self-evaluation never did.
*
* Gates:
* - Edit/Write: list importers, affected API, verify data schemas, quote instruction
* - Bash (destructive): list targets, rollback plan, quote instruction
* - Bash (routine): quote current instruction (once per session)
*
* Compatible with run-with-flags.js via module.exports.run().
* Cross-platform (Windows, macOS, Linux).
*
* Full package with config support: pip install gateguard-ai
* Repo: https://github.com/zunoworks/gateguard
*/
'use strict';
const crypto = require('crypto');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
// Session state — scoped per session to avoid cross-session races.
// Uses CLAUDE_SESSION_ID (set by Claude Code) or falls back to PID-based isolation.
const STATE_DIR = process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR || path.join(process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || '/tmp', '.gateguard');
const SESSION_ID = process.env.CLAUDE_SESSION_ID || process.env.ECC_SESSION_ID || `pid-${process.ppid || process.pid}`;
const STATE_FILE = path.join(STATE_DIR, `state-${SESSION_ID.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, '_')}.json`);
// State expires after 30 minutes of inactivity
const SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000;
// Maximum checked entries to prevent unbounded growth
const MAX_CHECKED_ENTRIES = 500;
const DESTRUCTIVE_BASH = /\b(rm\s+-rf|git\s+reset\s+--hard|git\s+checkout\s+--|git\s+clean\s+-f|drop\s+table|delete\s+from|truncate|git\s+push\s+--force|dd\s+if=)\b/i;
// --- State management (per-session, atomic writes, bounded) ---
function loadState() {
try {
if (fs.existsSync(STATE_FILE)) {
const state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(STATE_FILE, 'utf8'));
const lastActive = state.last_active || 0;
if (Date.now() - lastActive > SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS) {
try { fs.unlinkSync(STATE_FILE); } catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
return { checked: [], last_active: Date.now() };
}
return state;
}
} catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
return { checked: [], last_active: Date.now() };
}
function saveState(state) {
try {
state.last_active = Date.now();
// Prune checked list if it exceeds the cap.
// Preserve session keys (__prefixed) so gates like __bash_session__ don't re-fire.
if (state.checked.length > MAX_CHECKED_ENTRIES) {
const sessionKeys = state.checked.filter(k => k.startsWith('__'));
const fileKeys = state.checked.filter(k => !k.startsWith('__'));
// Cap session keys at 50 to prevent unbounded growth
const cappedSession = sessionKeys.length > 50 ? sessionKeys.slice(-50) : sessionKeys;
const remaining = MAX_CHECKED_ENTRIES - cappedSession.length;
state.checked = [...cappedSession, ...fileKeys.slice(-Math.max(remaining, 0))];
}
fs.mkdirSync(STATE_DIR, { recursive: true });
// Atomic write: temp file + rename prevents partial reads
const tmpFile = STATE_FILE + '.tmp.' + process.pid;
fs.writeFileSync(tmpFile, JSON.stringify(state, null, 2), 'utf8');
fs.renameSync(tmpFile, STATE_FILE);
} catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
}
function markChecked(key) {
const state = loadState();
if (!state.checked.includes(key)) {
state.checked.push(key);
saveState(state);
}
}
function isChecked(key) {
const state = loadState();
return state.checked.includes(key);
}
// Prune stale session files older than 1 hour
(function pruneStaleFiles() {
try {
const files = fs.readdirSync(STATE_DIR);
const now = Date.now();
for (const f of files) {
if (!f.startsWith('state-') || !f.endsWith('.json')) continue;
const fp = path.join(STATE_DIR, f);
const stat = fs.statSync(fp);
if (now - stat.mtimeMs > SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS * 2) {
fs.unlinkSync(fp);
}
}
} catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
})();
// --- Sanitize file path against injection ---
function sanitizePath(filePath) {
// Strip control chars (including null), bidi overrides, and newlines
return filePath.replace(/[\x00-\x1f\x7f\u200e\u200f\u202a-\u202e\u2066-\u2069]/g, ' ').trim().slice(0, 500);
}
// --- Gate messages ---
function editGateMsg(filePath) {
const safe = sanitizePath(filePath);
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
'',
`Before editing ${safe}, present these facts:`,
'',
'1. List ALL files that import/require this file (use Grep)',
'2. List the public functions/classes affected by this change',
'3. If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',
'4. Quote the user\'s current instruction verbatim',
'',
'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.'
].join('\n');
}
function writeGateMsg(filePath) {
const safe = sanitizePath(filePath);
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
'',
`Before creating ${safe}, present these facts:`,
'',
'1. Name the file(s) and line(s) that will call this new file',
'2. Confirm no existing file serves the same purpose (use Glob)',
'3. If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',
'4. Quote the user\'s current instruction verbatim',
'',
'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.'
].join('\n');
}
function destructiveBashMsg() {
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
'',
'Destructive command detected. Before running, present:',
'',
'1. List all files/data this command will modify or delete',
'2. Write a one-line rollback procedure',
'3. Quote the user\'s current instruction verbatim',
'',
'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.'
].join('\n');
}
function routineBashMsg() {
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
'',
'Quote the user\'s current instruction verbatim.',
'Then retry the same operation.'
].join('\n');
}
// --- Deny helper ---
function denyResult(reason) {
return {
stdout: JSON.stringify({
hookSpecificOutput: {
hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
permissionDecision: 'deny',
permissionDecisionReason: reason
}
}),
exitCode: 0
};
}
// --- Core logic (exported for run-with-flags.js) ---
function run(rawInput) {
let data;
try {
data = typeof rawInput === 'string' ? JSON.parse(rawInput) : rawInput;
} catch (_) {
return rawInput; // allow on parse error
}
const rawToolName = data.tool_name || '';
const toolInput = data.tool_input || {};
// Normalize: case-insensitive matching via lookup map
const TOOL_MAP = { 'edit': 'Edit', 'write': 'Write', 'multiedit': 'MultiEdit', 'bash': 'Bash' };
const toolName = TOOL_MAP[rawToolName.toLowerCase()] || rawToolName;
if (toolName === 'Edit' || toolName === 'Write') {
const filePath = toolInput.file_path || '';
if (!filePath) {
return rawInput; // allow
}
if (!isChecked(filePath)) {
markChecked(filePath);
return denyResult(toolName === 'Edit' ? editGateMsg(filePath) : writeGateMsg(filePath));
}
return rawInput; // allow
}
if (toolName === 'MultiEdit') {
const edits = toolInput.edits || [];
for (const edit of edits) {
const filePath = edit.file_path || '';
if (filePath && !isChecked(filePath)) {
markChecked(filePath);
return denyResult(editGateMsg(filePath));
}
}
return rawInput; // allow
}
if (toolName === 'Bash') {
const command = toolInput.command || '';
if (DESTRUCTIVE_BASH.test(command)) {
// Gate destructive commands on first attempt; allow retry after facts presented
const key = '__destructive__' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(command).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
if (!isChecked(key)) {
markChecked(key);
return denyResult(destructiveBashMsg());
}
return rawInput; // allow retry after facts presented
}
if (!isChecked('__bash_session__')) {
markChecked('__bash_session__');
return denyResult(routineBashMsg());
}
return rawInput; // allow
}
return rawInput; // allow
}
module.exports = { run };