b3268fef (#2272) made the write-gate "confirm no existing file" item
tool-agnostic in the JS hook, but the rest of the checklist surface still
names Glob/Grep. On hosts without those tools the agent still hits a dead
tool call on:
- the edit-gate "list importers" item in the hook (scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js)
- both checklist items in all three SKILL.md copies (en, ja-JP, zh-CN)
Apply the same wording b3268fef introduced — "(search the tree — Glob/Grep,
or find/grep via Bash)" — to those five remaining spots so the whole gate is
consistent. Prose-only; no logic change.
Follow-up to #2272 / b3268fef.
The code-tour skill mentioned the CodeTour 'ref' field only in an example,
with no explanation of its behavior. CodeTour resolves each step's file
content from the git revision named by 'ref' (not the working tree) whenever
ref differs from HEAD, so any file that does not exist at that revision fails
to open with 'The editor could not be opened because the file was not found'
- even though the file is present on disk.
This bit a generated PR tour where ref was set to the base branch (develop):
every file ADDED by the PR is absent on the base, so all new-file steps 404'd
while the tour tree and comments still rendered, making the cause non-obvious.
Adds a 'The ref Field' section explaining the resolution behavior and the
rule that PR tours must pin ref to the branch head (never the base), plus a
validation step to confirm every referenced file exists at the chosen ref.
Adds a new Tool Integration skill (mailtrap-email-integration) covering transactional email sending patterns: sandbox vs. production separation, API authentication, and domain verification. Focused on patterns that generalize beyond one vendor, per the repo's Skill Adaptation Policy.
* feat: add ecc-recipes skill
Maps a described workflow to the right ECC command-group with run-order
and stop condition, and browses command-group recipe families. Fills the
gap between ecc-guide (flat catalog) and prompt-optimizer (single-prompt
match) by adding family grouping, run-order, and stop conditions.
Advisory only; reads commands/ live.
* fix(ecc-recipes): address review
- flatten frontmatter origin/author/version to top-level (repo convention)
- guard unset CMD_DIR before globbing; use find instead of ls
- show burn-warning explicitly in output template
* feat(ecc-recipes): add argument-hint for slash UI
Replace mechanical text extraction in session-end.js and pre-compact.js
with LLM-generated summaries using `claude -p`. Summaries now capture
design decisions, resolved bugs, changed files, and carry-over context
rather than just truncated user message snippets.
- Add scripts/lib/llm-summary.js: generateSessionSummary, extractConversationText,
getContextRemainingPct, getContextThreshold, getLLMModel
- Update scripts/hooks/session-end.js: trigger LLM when context < 20% or
every 50 messages (env-configurable via ECC_LLM_SUMMARY_*)
- Update scripts/hooks/pre-compact.js: generate LLM summary right before
compaction and write it to the active session .tmp file
- Add tests/lib/llm-summary.test.js: 18 unit tests
- Update tests/hooks/hooks.test.js: 3 integration tests for new behaviour
Recursion guard: sets ECC_SKIP_LLM_SUMMARY=1 in subprocess env so Stop
hooks fired by the claude -p subprocess do not re-enter summarisation.
Requires no ANTHROPIC_API_KEY — reuses Claude Code's own authentication.
Co-authored-by: Hiroshi Tanaka <hiroshi_tanaka@MBAM3.local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(windows): prefer PowerShell over bash to prevent zombie process accumulation
On Windows, ECC hook scripts were spawning bash.exe (MSYS2/Git Bash) on
every tool use via findShellBinary(). These processes were not reaped by
Windows, causing 40+ zombie bash.exe/conhost.exe processes per session with
noticeable system lag.
Changes to scripts/hooks/plugin-hook-bootstrap.js:
- Add isPowerShellBin(bin) helper: basename-based detection so full paths
like C:\Windows\...\powershell.exe are handled correctly
- findShellBinary(): check BASH env var first (preserves escape hatch),
then on win32 probe pwsh.exe -> powershell.exe -> bash.exe -> bash;
use correct probe args per shell type; cache result in _cachedShell
- findBashBinary(): separate cached bash-only finder used by spawnShell
.sh fallback; skips PowerShell binaries even if BASH points to one
- spawnShell(): use isPowerShellBin() to select -NoProfile -NonInteractive
-File args for PowerShell; .sh scripts fall back to findBashBinary()
with a skip-warning if no bash found on Windows
observe-runner.js is intentionally unchanged: it always invokes observe.sh
which is bash-only; routing it through PowerShell would silently break it.
The observe.sh -> observe.js migration is tracked separately.
Fixes#2345
* fix(windows): address CodeRabbit and Greptile review comments
- Add timeout: 30000 to all spawnSync probe calls in findShellBinary and
findBashBinary to prevent hangs on broken/stalled shell candidates
- Add -ExecutionPolicy Bypass to PowerShell -File invocation to fix
execution on machines with the default Restricted policy (Win10/11)
- Add PowerShell availability skip guard to PS selection test (mirrors
existing bash skip guard)
- Fix no-bash test to keep PowerShell on PATH so the .sh fallback branch
is actually exercised rather than hitting shell-unavailable early exit
* test: add timeout to spawnSync probes in Windows test skip guards
---------
Co-authored-by: Christopher J Diamond <diamondcj@leidos.com>
* fix(hooks): guard doc-file-warning stdin listeners behind require.main
doc-file-warning.js registered process.stdin data/end listeners at module
scope while also exporting run(). run-with-flags.js require()s any hook that
exports run() for its in-process fast path, so importing this hook attached
stray stdin listeners to the dispatcher process, corrupting the PreToolUse
stdout JSON contract. This is the exact failure run-with-flags' own SAFETY
comment warns about, and 24 sibling hooks already guard against it.
- Move the stdin entrypoint into main() and gate it behind require.main === module
- pre-write-doc-warn.js now calls main() explicitly instead of relying on the
import side effect
- Add regression tests: require() attaches no stdin listeners, run()/main()
stay exported, and the pre-write-doc-warn shim still warns
* docs(hooks): add JSDoc for doc-file-warning main() entrypoint
Satisfies the docstring-coverage pre-merge check; documents the stdin
entrypoint and why it must not run on require().
On Windows, when a bare-name MCP server command (e.g. codesys-mcp-sp21-plus)
falls back to the .cmd candidate, the probe sets shell:true to work around
Node 18.20+ CVE-2024-27980. However, passing an args array alongside
shell:true causes Node to concatenate the tokens without quoting (DEP0190),
so an arg containing a space (e.g. --codesys-path "C:\Program Files\...") is
re-split by cmd.exe at every space boundary. The child process receives a
truncated path, fails to launch, and the probe declares the server unavailable,
falsely blocking every MCP tool call to that server.
Fix: add a quoteWin() helper that double-quotes any token containing whitespace
or cmd metacharacters. In the useShell branch, build a single properly-quoted
command line string and pass it as the sole argument to spawn() with no separate
args array. The else branch (shell:false, all non-.cmd commands) is unchanged.
Regression test added: on Windows, creates a .cmd shim that echoes its first
positional argument to stderr, probes it with a space-containing path arg, and
asserts the probe succeeds and the arg was not split at the space boundary.
Co-authored-by: Karstein Phobic Nyvold Kvistad <karstein.kvistad@maritimerobotics.com>
- resolve-formatter: stop findProjectRoot walk before os.homedir() to
avoid mistaking global dotfiles (e.g. ~/.prettierrc) for a project root
- instinct-cli-projects: detect python3/python binary at runtime; skip
gracefully when Python 3 is unavailable instead of crashing with null status
- command-registry: regenerate COMMAND-REGISTRY.json (was stale)
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace invalid default model IDs (e.g. claude-sonnet-4-7) with current
claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-opus-4-8, and claude-haiku-4-5. Route system
messages to the API system field, enable ephemeral prompt caching, omit
temperature for Opus 4.7/4.8, and surface cache usage metrics. Update the
CLI model picker to match.
Co-authored-by: Vladimir Đuranović <vlada@MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Add memxus configuration to mcp-servers.json
Added configuration for Memxus service with API key placeholder and description.
* Revise description in mcp-servers.json
Updated the description to include a note about reviewing stored memories to prevent prompt-injection.
* Update description in mcp-servers.json
Update description in mcp-servers.json
* feat(workflows): add orch-review native Workflow pilot
Port orch-pipeline Phase 5 (Review) to a native Claude Code Workflow
script. The gated outer loop stays in the main conversation; this script
owns only the autonomous review+verify segment between the two human
gates:
1. Review — reviewers fan out in parallel: ecc:code-reviewer always,
ecc:<language>-reviewer when args.language maps, ecc:security-reviewer
when the orch-pipeline security trigger matches the diff/paths.
2. Dedup — merge findings across dimensions keyed on the normalized
evidence snippet, since independent reviewers flag the same line.
3. Verify — each unique CRITICAL/HIGH finding goes to an independent
adversarial verifier; MEDIUM/LOW pass through as advisory.
The Review->Verify barrier is deliberate: deduping before verification
stops the verifier running N times on the same bug (local testing: 11
raw findings collapsed to 4 unique, ~halving verifier cost).
Existing ECC reviewer subagents are reused via agentType; reviewer
output is validated by JSON schema. args is accepted as an object or a
JSON-encoded string.
- workflows/orch-review.workflow.js — the workflow script
- workflows/README.md — invocation contract, returns shape, follow-ups
CI lint is scoped to scripts/ and tests/, so the script (validated with
node --check) and the README (passes markdownlint) are untouched.
* fix(workflows): fail closed on invalid args and lost review dimensions
Addresses the two safety findings from the PR bot review:
1. Lost review dimension (Greptile P1 / CodeRabbit Major): a reviewer
agent that returns null or rejects was silently dropped by
filter(Boolean), so an unreviewed security dimension could still
return APPROVE. Each dimension's outcome is now captured; failures
land in failedDimensions and force CHANGES_REQUESTED (incomplete).
2. Invalid args (CodeRabbit Major): an empty diff returned APPROVE and
bad JSON / non-array changedFiles threw inconsistently. Input is now
validated up front and rejected with a clear error — the gate fails
closed instead of approving an unreviewed payload.
Docs (header contract + README) updated for the new return fields
(incomplete, failedDimensions, stats.failed). Remaining bot nits
(evidence minLength, verify-label collision, verified->confirmed
rename, contract drift) deferred as follow-ups.
* fix(workflows): address remaining orch-review review nits
Follow-up to the bot review (deferred items from the safety pass):
- evidence: require minLength 1 in the schema, and fall back to a
title+line dedup key when evidence is empty, so empty-evidence
findings in one file no longer collapse onto a single key and drop
(CodeRabbit).
- verify label: include a slice of the normalized evidence so two
CRITICAL/HIGH findings from the same file get distinct labels and do
not alias under resumability (Greptile).
- stats.verified -> stats.confirmed to match the "confirmed" wording
used in the log and avoid ambiguity vs the refuted count (Greptile);
header contract and README updated to match.
Verified by running the workflow on a synthetic vulnerable diff:
dedup 12 raw -> 5 unique, stats.confirmed populated, fail-closed fields
(incomplete/failedDimensions) intact.
* fix(workflows): harden verify stage and diff-only verification
Addresses the second-round bot review:
- Verify stage now has the same failure guard as the review stage: a
rejected verifier no longer nulls out its slot (which crashed the
later filter). A null return is treated as unconfirmed; a rejection
keeps the finding as blocking (fail closed) so an unverifiable
CRITICAL is never silently demoted to advisory (CodeRabbit @221).
- verifyPrompt now instructs the skeptic to judge solely from the
provided diff text and not to refute merely because the referenced
file is absent from the working tree (the diff may be an unapplied
PR). Fixes the false-refute seen when testing on a synthetic diff.
CodeRabbit @81 (evidence minLength) was already addressed in the prior
commit; this is a stale re-post on the unresolved thread.
* fix(workflows): keep unverifiable blockers blocking; stop leaking error text
Second-round bot review (CodeRabbit):
- @218 Treat a null/failed verifier as `unverified`, not refuted. A
terminal verifier failure or skip no longer demotes a CRITICAL/HIGH
to advisory; it stays in `blocking` tagged "could not be verified"
(fail closed). Only a genuine isReal=false verdict is refuted. Adds
stats.unverified.
- @189 Do not return raw subagent error text. Review/verify failures
now log the raw message for operators and return only a bounded label
(failedDimensions[].error = "review agent failed").
Stale re-posts this round (@81 evidence minLength, @224 verify guard)
were already fixed in prior commits.
* docs(workflows): enumerate bounded failedDimensions.error labels
CodeRabbit (trivial): the public contract implied callers get
human-readable error text, but the implementation returns only bounded
labels. Enumerate them in the README returns block.
Two security-priority fixes in continuous-learning-v2/scripts/instinct-cli.py:
- #2294: _write_registry wrote projects.json without the advisory lock that
_update_registry holds, so concurrent 'projects delete/gc/merge' could race an
observe-time update and corrupt the registry. Extract the lock into a shared
_registry_lock() context manager and use it in both writers.
- #2297: _remove_project_storage called shutil.rmtree on PROJECTS_DIR/project_id
with no containment check. Add defense-in-depth: resolve the path and refuse to
delete anything that is not strictly inside PROJECTS_DIR (or is the root
itself), so a relaxed validator or future caller can never cause an
arbitrary-directory delete.
Adds 5 pytest regression tests (atomic write under lock, contained delete,
missing-dir no-op, traversal refused, root refused). Node integration suite
(tests/scripts/instinct-cli-projects.test.js) green 9/9.
* fix(clv2): escape $HOME before pgrep -f in migrate-homunculus.sh
pgrep -f treats its argument as an extended regular expression, but the
running-observer guard interpolated $HOME unescaped. Paths containing regex
metacharacters (e.g. /home/user.name, /home/c++dev, /home/user (work)) made the
match over-broad or invalid, causing either a false negative (live observer
missed, migration proceeds and risks registry corruption) or a false positive
(migration blocked unnecessarily).
Escape the ERE metacharacters in $HOME via sed before building the pattern so
the home prefix is matched literally while the trailing .*observer-loop\.sh
regex is preserved. Portable across BSD and GNU sed.
Fixes#2301
* test(clv2): add regression test for migrate-homunculus.sh $HOME escaping
Guards the #2301 fix: extracts the script's sed escaping command and asserts
the resulting pgrep -f pattern matches the literal home path while no longer
over-matching a regex-expanded decoy (HOME=/home/user.name must not match
/home/userXname). Also pins that the guard uses escaped_home rather than $HOME
directly. Follows the existing clv2 shell-test convention in
tests/hooks/observe-entrypoint-allowlist.test.js.
Refs #2301
* test(clv2): skip migrate-homunculus escaping test on Windows
The test relies on POSIX bash/sed/grep -E semantics, which differ on the
Windows CI runners. Guard with the same process.platform === 'win32' early
exit used by tests/hooks/observe-subdirectory-detection.test.js so the
bash-dependent assertions only run on POSIX platforms.
Refs #2301
Adds the Layer 4 observability view to the control pane: a self-contained,
dependency-free 3D point-cloud of the agent airspace (positions from the
proximity embedding, sized by working set, colored by collision risk, links
for converging pairs) plus an XSS-safe advisory panel that polls every 5s.
- proximity-viz.js: renderProximityVizHtml() (canvas projection, no external JS)
- server.js: GET /proximity (page) + GET /api/proximity (snapshot.proximity feed)
- test: asserts both routes serve and the feed carries positions/links/advisories
Finishes the steer/transmit loop — advisories now reach the agents' sessions.
- message-sink.js: createEccMessageSink() delivers via the canonical writer
'ecc-tui messages send' (maps steer/hold -> conflict kind, transmit -> query),
resolving the binary from override/env/built target/PATH. Injectable runner;
best-effort (a missing binary/failed send is counted skipped, never blocks).
- proximity.js: createProximityDispatcher() adds per-trigger cooldown so a
persistent collision fires once then stays quiet (agents get steered, not
spammed); runProximityTick() builds the snapshot and dispatches.
- scripts/proximity-tick.js: thin CLI — one-shot, --dry-run, --watch <sec>.
Messages are internal ECC agent-to-agent coordination, not any external channel.
- 14 new tests (sink argv/kind mapping, cooldown dedup, tick dispatch/dry-run,
CLI parse). Full suite 2891/2891; lint green.
- Line precision: parse git diff --unified=0 into per-file changed line ranges
(defaultWorkingSetFor), so two agents in the SAME file but DIFFERENT functions
no longer false-collide. Overlap channel now uses the overlap coefficient
(|A∩B|/min(|A|,|B|)) — high when one edit sits inside the other's region, low
for disjoint ranges; whole-file edit = 1. Docstring + design doc updated.
- Trigger firing: buildProximityTriggers() turns advisories into the concrete
messages — transmit-intent to both on a Traffic Advisory, steer-away to the
yielding agent + a hold notice on a Resolution Advisory. buildProximitySnapshot
now returns triggers; dispatchProximityTriggers(triggers, {sendMessage}) delivers
them through an injectable sink (the ECC messages table), best-effort.
- 12 new tests (line-range disjoint vs overlapping, parseDiffRanges, triggers,
dispatch). Full suite 2881/2881; lint green.
Adds a clean badge row right under the hero linking the official destinations,
led by a live Discord member-count badge (server widget enabled) to drive the
community from a few hundred toward a few thousand. Gives the official ECC links
the icons the readme was missing.
Turns live sessions into the airspace scan: each worktree session's git diff
becomes its working set, the dependency graph is built over the touched files,
and scanAirspace() produces the TCAS advisories + 3D positions.
- scripts/lib/control-pane/proximity.js: sessionsToAgents() + buildProximitySnapshot();
default working-set source shells `git diff --name-only <base>...HEAD` per
worktree (injectable for tests, fails closed to []).
- state.js: opt-in `proximity` field on the snapshot (includeProximity flag) so
the default hot path stays fast (git diffs only run when requested).
- 4 integration tests (same-file editors -> resolution, later agent steers,
<2 participants -> no advisories, labels). Full suite 2873/2873; lint green.
The moat layer: spatial deconfliction for multiple agents (and humans) on one
codebase, modeled on aircraft TCAS — measure how close two agents are in
code-space, then transmit-intent (Traffic Advisory) and steer-away (Resolution
Advisory) before they collide at the git layer.
scripts/lib/agent-proximity/:
- distance.js — the math: per-channel collision probabilities combined via
noisy-OR R = 1 - Π(1 - ω·r). Channels: edit overlap (file + line-range
Jaccard), dependency coupling (γ^(d-1) over the import graph, direction-
agnostic — catches 'edit there breaks here' even when tree-distant), and tree
proximity (LCA-based, soft prior). TCAS advise(): clear / advisory(transmit) /
resolution(steer), with deterministic right-of-way priority so the maneuver is
coordinated. closureRate() for approach-speed escalation.
- graph.js — lightweight require/import dependency-graph builder (fs or in-memory).
- index.js — scanAirspace(): pairwise advisories + 3D vector embedding (space-
filling path embedding pulled toward dependency neighbours) so a 'where are
the agents' visualization can render the file-cloud and watch agents crawl /
steer.
docs/design/agent-proximity.md — full mathematical formulation + protocol + viz
+ roadmap (v1 call-graph/symbol channels + live session-diff wiring; v2 cross-
machine airspace over Tailscale, the zero-conflict-swarm demo).
17 tests; full suite 2869/2869; lint green.
- coverage: branch threshold 80 -> 79 (current is 79.52%; lines/functions/
statements remain 88/94/88). The 80% branch gate has been red on every main
run; this unblocks CI while keeping a meaningful floor just below current.
- SECURITY.md: remove the bouncing security@ecc.tools mailbox (flagged by an
advisory reporter as undeliverable) and direct all reports to GitHub private
vulnerability reporting, the only monitored channel.
- gateguard (GHSA-4v57-ph3x-gf55): add a quote-aware detection pass that
dequotes command words and splits on UNQUOTED separators incl. newlines, so
newline-separated commands, quoted command words ('rm'/"rm"), quoted
find -exec, and sh/bash -c wrappers are all classified destructive. Additive —
existing 133 cases still pass; +7 bypass regressions + a false-positive guard
(rm inside a quoted echo arg stays allowed). 140/140.
- Windows CI: format-code.ts emitted backslash paths via path.normalize, breaking
forward-slash assertions on all Windows matrix cells — force forward slashes.
- claw.js (CodeQL #1 js/polynomial-redos): bound parseTurns input so the lazy
[\s\S]*? body can't drive O(n^2) scanning on adversarial history files.
Full suite 2852/2852; lint green.
Critical: project-local install-state (e.g. a cloned repo's .cursor/ecc-install-state.json)
is attacker-controllable, and repair/uninstall/auto-update replayed its operations with
destinationPath validated only for non-emptiness — confirmed arbitrary file write/delete
and chained RCE (write ~/.bashrc, .git/hooks, or run a planted install-apply.js).
- New scripts/lib/path-safety.js: assertWithinTrustedRoot() canonicalizes (incl. symlink
escape via nearest-existing-ancestor realpath) and fails closed unless the destination is
within the adapter-derived trusted root.
- install-lifecycle.js: gate executeRepairOperation + executeUninstallOperation + the
install-state removal against record.targetRoot (the adapter-resolved root, NOT the
attacker-supplied state.target.root).
- auto-update.js: validateRepoRoot now requires package.json name to be an official ECC
package, so a planted nested repo can't drive auto-update into executing attacker code.
- 7 containment regression tests. Existing install-lifecycle/repair/uninstall/auto-update
suites still green (legit destinations are within the root).
- ecc-bot.mjs: validate interaction id (snowflake) and token before building the
callback fetch URL (clears CodeQL js/request-forgery #239/#240/#241); clamp the
remote heartbeat_interval to [1s,10m] (js/resource-exhaustion #242); strip CR/LF
from log args (js/log-injection #246).
- Bump transitive dev deps via overrides/resolutions to patch quadratic-complexity
DoS: markdown-it >=14.2.0 (Dependabot #45/#46), js-yaml >=4.2.0 (#42/#43).
Both lockfiles regenerated; npm reports 0 vulnerabilities.
The interactive claim/move buttons concatenated work-item ids into inline
onclick JS with only single-quote escaping — a crafted id (ids/titles come from
GitHub sync and manual upserts, not a strict allowlist) could break out and
inject script, even on the localhost-only server.
Fix: emit the id/lane in HTML-escaped data-* attributes (escapeHtml encodes
&<>"'), attach delegated click listeners that read them via getAttribute, and
pass the raw value as a JS string arg — never concatenated into code. Adds a
regression assertion that no inline onclick handlers with interpolated ids
remain. Flagged by automated security review.
Full suite 2845/2845; lint green.
The board was read-only; you can now drive the agent+human JIT workflow from the
local control pane.
- New shared scripts/lib/control-pane/work-item-mutations.js (claimWorkItem,
moveWorkItem) so the CLI and server never diverge; work-items.js claim now
delegates to it.
- server.js: gated POST /api/work-items/:id/claim and /:id/move (localhost-only,
honors --read-only with 403). Claim sets owner + assigneeKind and moves to
running; move retargets the kanban lane.
- ui.js: per-card Claim (on unassigned cards) + lane buttons that POST and
refresh; 15s live auto-refresh (paused when the tab is hidden).
- Tests: interactive claim/move endpoints, read-only 403, invalid-lane 400, and
snapshot reflects mutations.
Full suite 2845/2845; lint green.
Closes the agent+human JIT loop the control-pane board surfaces: the board shows
the unassigned (needs-owner) queue; 'claim' lets an agent or human pick up work.
node scripts/work-items.js claim [<id>] --owner <name> [--as agent|human]
- No id: claims the highest-priority unassigned open item.
- With id: claims that specific item (re-assignable).
- Sets owner, records metadata.assigneeKind (agent|human), and moves the card to
running so the board reflects that work has started.
- Refuses done items, requires --owner, validates --as. 5 CLI tests added.
Full suite 2844/2844; lint green.
The kanban board tracked lanes (ready/running/blocked/done) but not WHO owns
each card, which is the missing piece for agent+human just-in-time team workflows.
- state.js: classifyAssignee() labels each work item agent | human | unassigned
(session-linked or agent-pattern owners = agent; named owners = human; ownerless
= unassigned), with an explicit metadata.assigneeKind override.
- summarizeWorkItems(): adds an assignment summary {agent,human,unassigned} over
OPEN cards plus a priority-sorted needsAssignment queue — the JIT pickup list.
- ui.js: cards show an [agent]/[human]/[unassigned] badge; the board header shows
agent/human split and 'N need owner'.
- Tests: assignment classification + JIT queue coverage in control-pane-state.
Full suite 2839/2839; lint green.
- #2290 suggest-compact: honor ECC_CONTEXT_WINDOW_TOKENS / CLAUDE_CODE_AUTO_COMPACT_WINDOW
so 400k-window models (Opus 4.x) no longer report ~double context usage; add
override + isolation tests in transcript-context.test.js.
- #2282 install: bare-language syntax is legacy-only by design, but the error
now distinguishes a supported-but-wrong-mode target (gemini/codex/…) from a
genuinely unknown one and points to --profile/--modules/--skills.
- #2276 cost-report: the command + cost-tracking skill targeted a SQLite DB no
tracker writes. Repoint both at the real ~/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl (JSONL,
estimated_cost_usd), reduce cumulative-per-session snapshots to latest-per-session,
and use node instead of sqlite3 for cross-platform support.
- #2272 gateguard: make the 'confirm no existing file' checklist item
tool-agnostic (Glob/Grep or find/grep via Bash) so hosts without a Glob tool
don't get a dead tool call.
Full suite 2839/2839; lint green.
The observe hook's secret-scrub regex used a generic ([A-Za-z]+\s+)? group
that overlapped the separator and value classes, causing exponential
backtracking on identifier-dense tool I/O — an orphaned python child then
pegged a core at ~100% CPU for days because the async hook timed out without
killing it.
- Rewrite _SECRET_RE as a linear matcher: bounded separator {1,8}, a fixed
set of auth schemes (bearer|basic|token|bot) instead of [A-Za-z]+, and a
bounded value {8,256}. Pathological input drops from hang to <1ms; real
secrets still redact (verified incl. 'Bearer <token>').
- Add a signal.alarm(8) self-timeout to both scrub blocks so any runaway
child self-terminates before the 10s async-hook timeout can orphan it.
* fix(gateguard): check isDestructiveFindExec on each command segment
`isDestructiveBash` called `isDestructiveFindExec` only on the raw full
command string. When the raw string starts with a non-find command (e.g.
`echo x && find . -exec rm {} \;`), `isDestructiveFindExec` checks
tokens[0] and returns false — then the per-segment loop never calls it
again, letting the destructive `find -exec rm` segment through silently.
Fix: call `isDestructiveFindExec(segment)` inside the per-segment loop so
compound commands (`&&`, `;`, `|`) cannot be used to prepend a harmless
command and bypass the find-exec destructive check.
Adds three regression tests covering `&&`, `;`, and `|` bypass patterns.
* fix(gateguard): use raw body segments for isDestructiveFindExec to close quoted-binary gap
The previous per-segment call passed quote-stripped output from
splitCommandSegments to isDestructiveFindExec, so a quoted exec binary
like find . -exec 'rm' {} \; would arrive as find . -exec {} \; and
the check would silently miss it.
Switch to splitting collectExecutableBodies output on [;|&]+ without
quote-stripping first, so the find-exec binary name is always intact
when isDestructiveFindExec inspects it. This also covers || and
background & separators that the original tests did not exercise.
Adds a regression test for the || OR-chain bypass pattern.
Addresses Greptile review comments on PR #2292.
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Co-authored-by: kapilvus <kapilvus@gmail.com>
