mirror of
https://github.com/affaan-m/everything-claude-code.git
synced 2026-06-20 03:40:29 +08:00
db7f2a6fd5
The official Agent Skills spec (agentskills.io/specification) whitelists exactly 6 top-level frontmatter keys (name/description/license/compatibility/metadata/ allowed-tools). A top-level `origin` key fails the official validator (anthropics/skills quick_validate.py ALLOWED_PROPERTIES; skills-ref validate). This moves `origin: X` -> `metadata.origin: X` across the canonical skills/ tree, preserving each value verbatim. Frontmatter-only, minimal diff. - 251 SKILL.md updated (242 new metadata block, 9 appended to existing metadata) - origin values preserved verbatim (verified 251/251) - YAML validated on all changed files - scoped to canonical skills/ only (docs/<lang> translations + tool mirrors .cursor/.kiro/.agents left untouched; presumably regenerated from canonical) Addresses #2233
77 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
77 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
name: safety-guard
|
|
description: Use this skill to prevent destructive operations when working on production systems or running agents autonomously.
|
|
metadata:
|
|
origin: ECC
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Safety Guard — Prevent Destructive Operations
|
|
|
|
## When to Use
|
|
|
|
- When working on production systems
|
|
- When agents are running autonomously (full-auto mode)
|
|
- When you want to restrict edits to a specific directory
|
|
- During sensitive operations (migrations, deploys, data changes)
|
|
|
|
## How It Works
|
|
|
|
Three modes of protection:
|
|
|
|
### Mode 1: Careful Mode
|
|
|
|
Intercepts destructive commands before execution and warns:
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
Watched patterns:
|
|
- rm -rf (especially /, ~, or project root)
|
|
- git push --force
|
|
- git reset --hard
|
|
- git checkout . (discard all changes)
|
|
- DROP TABLE / DROP DATABASE
|
|
- docker system prune
|
|
- kubectl delete
|
|
- chmod 777
|
|
- sudo rm
|
|
- npm publish (accidental publishes)
|
|
- Any command with --no-verify
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
When detected: shows what the command does, asks for confirmation, suggests safer alternative.
|
|
|
|
### Mode 2: Freeze Mode
|
|
|
|
Locks file edits to a specific directory tree:
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
/safety-guard freeze src/components/
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Any Write/Edit outside `src/components/` is blocked with an explanation. Useful when you want an agent to focus on one area without touching unrelated code.
|
|
|
|
### Mode 3: Guard Mode (Careful + Freeze combined)
|
|
|
|
Both protections active. Maximum safety for autonomous agents.
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
/safety-guard guard --dir src/api/ --allow-read-all
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Agents can read anything but only write to `src/api/`. Destructive commands are blocked everywhere.
|
|
|
|
### Unlock
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
/safety-guard off
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Implementation
|
|
|
|
Uses PreToolUse hooks to intercept Bash, Write, Edit, and MultiEdit tool calls. Checks the command/path against the active rules before allowing execution.
|
|
|
|
## Integration
|
|
|
|
- Enable by default for `codex -a never` sessions
|
|
- Pair with observability risk scoring in ECC 2.0
|
|
- Logs all blocked actions to `~/.claude/safety-guard.log`
|