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* feat(rules): add vue and nuxt rule sets Add rules/vue/ and rules/nuxt/, each with the standard 5-file layout (coding-style, hooks, patterns, security, testing) that extends common/, following the Adding a New Language convention in rules/README.md. Vue rules reference the frontend-patterns and vite-patterns skills. Nuxt rules reference the nuxt4-patterns and vite-patterns skills. Content is concise (1.5 to 4 KB per file) since rules load as always-on context. * fix(rules): address PR review on vue and nuxt rule sets - nuxt/coding-style: generalize the srcDir-override note (drop project-specific 'this repo' phrasing so it is correct for any Nuxt project). - vue/hooks: add **/*.ts and **/*.tsx to paths so the lint/typecheck guidance loads when editing composables and stores. - nuxt/hooks: add **/*.vue to paths (covers pages/layouts/components) and wrap nuxi typecheck in a timeout, mirroring web/hooks.md. - nuxt/security: tighten the /security-review auto-trigger scope to external fetch, credential handling, and sensitive mutations, with examples. - nuxt/testing: correct 'Vitest-only' to note built-in Playwright E2E, and drop the @nuxt/test-utils version pin. - README: register vue and nuxt in the structure tree and install examples. Skipped: 'X specific' -> 'X-specific' hyphenation (all existing rule sets use the unhyphenated form, changing only vue/nuxt would be inconsistent); repeating the 80%/TDD mandate in nuxt/testing (already inherited from common/testing.md).
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Vue Security
This file extends common/security.md with Vue specific content.
What Vue Escapes Automatically
- Text interpolation
{{ }}and dynamic attribute bindings (:title) are auto-escaped. The vectors below are NOT protected.
Rule No.1: Templates from Trusted Sources Only
- Never use non-trusted content as a component template. No runtime template compilation from user input.
- No user-controlled
:isthat resolves a component from an arbitrary string.
v-html and Render Functions
v-htmlbypasses escaping and is a direct XSS vector. Avoid it on user content.- If unavoidable, sanitize with DOMPurify (allowlist config) before binding, or render in a sandboxed iframe. Vue itself recommends sanitizing on the backend before persisting.
- Render-function and scoped-slot output carry the same risk. Passing user HTML through
h()withinnerHTMLisv-htmlby another name. Sanitize first.
URL, Style, and Event Injection
:hrefand:srcare not escaped.javascript:URLs execute. Validate the scheme, allowhttp/https/mailtoonly. Vue docs reference@braintree/sanitize-url, but sanitize on the backend before persisting.:stylewith user input is unsafe (CSS exfiltration). Use object syntax with whitelisted properties, never a raw user string.- Never bind user input to
onclick,onfocus, or any event attribute.
Client Bundle Secrets
- Anything in
import.meta.env.VITE_*ships to the browser. Keep API keys and tokens server-side. - Use httpOnly cookies for session tokens. Never bundle credentials into the client.
<!-- unsafe -->
<div v-html="userBio" />
<!-- safe -->
<div v-html="sanitize(userBio)" />
Reference
- ECC skills:
frontend-patterns,vite-patterns. - Docs: https://vuejs.org/guide/best-practices/security.html · https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify · https://github.com/braintree/sanitize-url